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THE IMPORTANCE OF TRUST AND DISTRUST 
Robin C. Feldman† 
RTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AI) is percolating through modern 
society. In the automobile industry, AI systems assist drivers 
with steering, changing lanes, and parking. Early AI projects in 
the criminal justice system predict where crime is likely to oc-
cur for the purpose of targeting policing. Smart glasses tailored to business 
applications are emerging into the marketplace. Eventually, these glasses 
will use machine learning to identify objects and voices, prompting the 
wearer to take certain actions or setting out a range of possible actions. 
Banking and insurance firms use AI to advise customers on financial services, 
assess consumer risk, and monitor for fraud. Employers use AI systems in 
hiring decisions. And in the health care field, invasive brain interfaces have 
demonstrated the ability for thought control of complex robotic limbs and 
virtual agents. 
As AI becomes a ubiquitous part of our everyday life, a key aspect will 
be the way in which society – and by extension, the legal system – manages 
both the integration of these systems and society’s expectations. Society 
will have to learn to trust the capacity of AI systems sufficiently so that it can 
soar to new heights, without succumbing to the “irrational exuberance”1 
                                                                                                                         
† Robin Feldman is a Visiting Professor at UCLA Law and the Harry & Lillian Hastings Professor of 
Law & Director of the Institute for Innovation Law at the University of California Hastings College 
of the Law. Copyright 2018 Robin C. Feldman. 
1 Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the Annual Dinner and Fran-
cis Boyer Lecture of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research: The 
Challenge of Central Banking in a Democratic Society (Dec. 5, 1996). 
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that can send society crashing to the ground when AI fails to live up to 
people’s blind expectations. And society must learn to tolerate the ambi-
guity that lies between these two extremes. 
I. 
THE STATE OF AI 
hat is referred to by the term “AI” is typically partitioned into two 
distinct categories corresponding to different levels of the charac-
teristic we intuitively understand as intelligence.2 The first, called “weak 
AI,” refers to any artificial agent that ingests data and responds to that data 
by completing a task. No matter how complicated the input data or the 
task, weak AI at best does no more than create the appearance of having a 
“mind” or “consciousness.” The second sort, “strong AI,” can do every-
thing weak AI can do, but is said to possess “a mind” and be truly capable 
of thought.  
All current AI is weak, and there is a very serious debate in the fields of 
computer science and philosophy over whether that can ever change. 
Weak AI is further subdivided into “narrow AI” and “Artificial General 
Intelligence.” This distinction is far more practical than the previous one. 
Narrow AI is defined as AI that can complete only one or a handful of pre-
specified tasks; Artificial General Intelligence is defined by its potentially 
unattainable ability to complete any task a human can, short of conscious-
ness. The AI we have today is weak and narrow. We are nowhere near 
Artificial General Intelligence, let alone the type of AI that resembles a 
conscious mind.  
One implementation, currently successful and in vogue, is the oft re-
ferred to “deep learning.” A full primer on the subject is beyond the scope 
of this article, but learning is an umbrella term that refers to a particular 
kind of mathematical model for analyzing data. These models, called neu-
ral networks by analogy (and only by analogy) to a conception of how the 
human brain operates, analyze data by applying a series of mathematical 
transformations. Each transformation in the series is referred to as a “lay-
er” of the neural network and deep learning refers to the field which con-
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cerns itself with neural networks having “many” layers. The iterative pro-
cess involved in the many layers is referred to as “training” the neural net-
work and the data is called the “training data.” Having large amounts of 
good data is essential for any deep learning project.  
Advancement in AI has moved at an extraordinary pace. Deep learn-
ing, which is the basis for the entire field of AI, was not practical until a 
2006 paper3 opened the door for quickly training neural nets. Since then, 
the field has moved in leaps and bounds, analogous to what would be 
many lifetimes in other industries. In fact, the basis for most modern neu-
ral nets, which rely on a class of models known as generative adversarial 
models, only emerged in 2014.4  
Consider perhaps the highest profile modern network, Google’s AlphaGo, 
for which there have been at least four different versions since 2015. The 
difference between the latest versions of AlphaGo would be analogous to 
the difference between the first rudimentary touchscreen phone – the IBM 
Simon from 25 years ago – and this year’s new iPad Pro. In the AI field, 
however, that advancement happened in under two years. 
For many, the notion of AI brings to mind an eerie computer voice an-
nouncing annihilation of those humans in the vicinity, if not the elimina-
tion of the entire human race, or at least some form of takeover in which 
humans are reduced to slaves serving the ever more powerful machine 
masters. However, the potential for truly sentient AI that can make deci-
sions and operate on its own remains in the minds of science fiction writ-
ers. For now, and for the foreseeable future, human augmentation systems 
will be the norm, and the optimal configuration will be a melding of hu-
man and machine capability. Consider chess, the basic bellweather for AI 
development. The 2005 Playchess.com tournament included teams of 
humans, teams of computers, and mixed teams. The tournament winner 
was a group of amateur chess players using three powerful computers.  
A more practical example of human augmentation systems can be found 
in labor organization. Siemens is currently working on a factory in which 
jobs are assigned to human workers by AI that knows a worker’s skill. As a 
                                                                                                                         
3 See Geoffrey E. Hinton, Simon Osindero & Yee-Whye Teh, A Fast Learning Algorithm for 
Deep Belief Nets, 18 NEURAL COMPUTATION 1527 (2006). 
4 See Ian J. Goodfellow et al., Generative Adversarial Nets, NEURAL INFO. PROCESSING SYS. 
PROC. (2014), papers.nips.cc/paper/5423-generative-adversarial-nets.pdf. 
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start, the AI will assign jobs that require human dexterity to humans while 
assigning jobs that can be done by robots to robots. As robotic dexterity 
improves across time, the “boss AI” can assign jobs to humans on the basis 
of other skills that robots lack, such as language and reasoning. As one of the 
researchers on the Siemens project noted, one would not want to reduce 
humans to mere tools in any system because then “we would just use an 
expensive human as an imprecise robot. When it comes to creativity and 
complex, intelligent tasks, this is where humans are superior.”5 The goal is 
to “build systems that combine strengths from both sides.”6 
In short, for the foreseeable future, the best approaches are likely to be 
systems that can augment human capacity, rather than systems that replace 
human beings and operate entirely on their own.7 For those who are movie 
buffs, think Iron Man, in which a weaponized suit enhances the protago-
nist’s capacities, as opposed to the Terminator, in which a machine-like 
cyborg does everything by itself. One can think of this human-AI inter-
face, not just as a screen sending information to a human, but as a human-
machine fusion, in which each can enhance the other or a form of aug-
mented intelligence.8 And even that imagery may be optimistic. As one 
expert commented to me, we can’t have anything remotely like Ironman 
because machines are just plain dumb. We still have to teach them what a 
                                                                                                                         
5 See Sean Captain, This AI Factory Boss Tells Robots & Humans How to Work Together, FAST 
COMPANY (August 7, 2017) (citing Florian Michahelles who heads the Siemens Web of 
Things research group in Berkeley, California), www.fastcompany.com/3067414/robo-
foremen-could-direct-human-and-robot-factory-workers-alike. 
6 See id. 
7 See Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 517, 539 (2015) 
(explaining that “robotics will continue to evolve, but mostly in ways that solve known 
technical challenges and reduce costs” and noting that “[l]ittle is gained, and much is argu-
ably lost, by pretending contemporary robots exhibit anything like intent”). 
8 See generally DOUG ENGLEBART, STANFORD RESEARCH INSTITUTE, AUGMENTED HUMAN 
INTELLECT STUDY (1962) (report prepared for the Air Force Office of Scientific Research) 
(coining and defining the term), web.stanford.edu/dept/SUL/library/extra4/sloan/ 
mousesite/EngelbartPapers/B5_F18_ConceptFrameworkPt1.html; see also Editorial, 
Anticipating AI, 532 NATURE 413 (Apr. 28, 2016) (noting that “advances in robot vision 
and hearing, combined with AI, are allowing robots to better perceive their environments,” 
which could lead to an “explosion of intelligent robot applications – including those in 
which intelligent robot applications work closely with humans), www.nature.com/ 
polopoly_fs/1.19825!/menu/main/topColumns/topLeftColumn/pdf/532413a.pdf. 
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stop sign is, and we are light years from a machine’s ability to think on its 
own.  
II. 
HOW TRUST AND DISTRUST  
CAN ENHANCE VULNERABILITIES 
ike a multifaceted jewel, trust has many planes, each of which inter-
sects with others. Only together can they create a brilliant image, and 
cracks in any single plane can threaten the whole. On the simplest level, 
people will have to be coaxed into using these new-fangled devices. This is 
not just a matter of encouraging those who are older than 40 to use social 
media. Absent widespread usage, the full potential of AI systems may be 
limited.  
Consider the potential for true driverless cars, not the driver assisted 
versions that exist today, but cars that operate without any driver at all. 
To achieve its maximum potential, driverless cars will be linked into net-
works with other driverless cars on the road.9 Your car will not just slow 
down when it senses that the car in front of you has slowed down; your 
car could react when the network tells it that a car 10 blocks ahead has 
altered its speed or trajectory. With a networked system of this sort, par-
ticularly one that can react faster than humans, cars will need less space 
between them, and traffic flows can be maximized so that riders spend less 
time on the road and consume less fuel.10  
Imagine the difficulties that arise if every now and then, we mix in a 
human driver. The safety and efficiency calculations become much more 
complex and challenging as we increase the level of uncertainly – both the 
uncertainty of whether a car down the road is human driven as well as the 
                                                                                                                         
9 See, e.g., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRANSP. SAFETY ADMIN., VEHICLE-TO-VEHICLE COMMUNICA-
TION, (2018), www.nhtsa.gov/technology-innovation/vehicle-vehicle-communication. 
10 See Chetan Belagal Math et al., Data Rate based Congestion Control in V2V communication for 
traffic safety applications, 2015 IEEE Symposium on Communications and Vehicular Technol-
ogy in the Benelux (2015), www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Data-Rate-based-Congestion-
Control-in-V2V-for-Math-Ozgur/72570d8a3be7bbe501e68a41e260862400cfbc35; Mary 
Beth Griggs, The Safer, Faster, More Efficient Commute Of The Future, POPULAR SCIENCE 
(Feb. 26, 2015), www.popsci.com/safer-faster-more-efficient-commute-future. 
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uncertainty of what the human driver will choose to do.11 In fact, in the 
current tests of driverless car systems, some of the greatest difficulties 
flow from interacting with human drivers on the road who are puzzlingly 
irrational. The point is simply that some of the power of AI systems de-
pends not just on whether humans can be coaxed into using them at all but 
also whether that use is widespread, even ubiquitous.12 
Trust has other facets as well. From a different perspective, both gov-
ernment and individuals in society will need to have confidence in the ac-
tions and choices made by AI technologies. If we want ordinary citizens to 
have faith in the credibility of AI, there must be methods of analyzing and 
validating the choices made – trust but verify, as the old saying goes.  
The entire issue of verification is complicated by the black box nature 
of certain AI systems – deep learning models being especially opaque. 
When decisions are being made that result in sending criminals to jail13 or 
choosing between killing the driver of an autonomous vehicle and a crowd 
of six,14 how do we develop the pathways for interrogating the technology 
to society’s satisfaction? And then, how do we translate that verification 
into language that will inspire confidence among all citizens?  
Both of these tasks will require a level of openness and candor that are 
not necessarily familiar to either industry or government players. In par-
ticular, a company’s first instinct is unlikely to encompass throwing open 
the doors to its technology, particularly if competitors are peering into the 
open doorway. Nevertheless, one cannot expect citizens to gain trust in AI 
simply because we say soothingly, “Don’t worry. We’ve got this cov-
ered.” And the results of lack of trust can be far-reaching. What happens if 
all citizens, or even only certain groups of citizens, believe they cannot 
trust any information they are receiving on any level? In that circum-
                                                                                                                         
11 See Matt Richtel & Conor Dougherty, Google’s Driverless Cars Run into Problems: Cars with 
Drivers, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2015), www.nytimes.com/2015/09/02/technology/ 
personaltech/google-says-its-not-the-driverless-cars-fault-its-other-drivers.html?_r=0.  
12 Kristen Hall-Geisler, All new cars could have V2V tech by 2023, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 2, 2017), 
techcrunch.com/2017/02/02/all-new-cars-could-have-v2v-tech-by-2023/. 
13 See Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu & Lauren Kirchner, Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA 
(May 23, 2016), www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-
sentencing. 
14 See Matt Simon, To Make Us All Safer, Robocars Will Sometimes Have to Kill, WIRED (March 
13, 2017), www.wired.com/2017/03/make-us-safer-robocars-will-sometimes-kill/.  
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stance, the breakdown of trust can be more serious than the disarray that 
can develop when individuals opt out of a linked network.  
Just as a failure of trust can be detrimental, we also cannot afford to 
indulge in a failure of skepticism about AI. As described earlier, the opti-
mal state of AI systems for the foreseeable future will involve human en-
hancement systems, that is, systems that work hand-in-bolt with humans. 
These may process information more quickly or more thoroughly. They 
may also enhance perception and reaction; but the systems will need hu-
man interface and, most important, human redundancy to provide the 
type of analysis and confirmation that only humans can. 
At a simplistic level, society will need to guard against the type of 
overconfidence that will lead us to attribute unrealistic capacity and accu-
racy to specific AI systems. Tesla drivers, for example, have climbed into 
the backseat of the car or driven with newspapers in front of their faces, 
giving the vehicles more unsupervised rein than their current capacity 
merits.15 As AI systems reach into everything from legal decisions to labor 
to health care, our expectations must keep pace with their limitations.  
Human judgment and interpretation also will be important for respond-
ing to and recovering from the types of security incursions that artificial 
technologies will face. Although most people think of network security in 
terms of warding off attacks and preventing penetration, the security field is 
moving towards a greater emphasis on detection and recovery. Estimates 
of the number of personal records stolen in 2016 alone are in the billions, 
and cyberattacks against the U.S. government have increased over the last 
decade from 5,500 to 77,000 a year.16 Just as one would not build a fence 
around a power plant and consider the plant to be secure, one cannot 
simply set up cybersecurity perimeters and consider the job done. The 
strength of any networked system lies in its resilience after an attacker has 
gained access to the network or even after a successful attack is underway. 
 
                                                                                                                         
15 See Mike Ramsey, Driver Videos Push Tesla’s ‘Autopilot’ to Its Limits, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 25, 
2015), www.wsj.com/articles/driver-videos-push-teslas-autopilot-to-its-limits-1445765404. 
16 See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., AGENCIES NEED TO IMPROVE CONTROLS OVER SE-
LECTED HIGH-IMPACT SYSTEMS, (May 18, 2016), www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-501; 
FIRE-EYE, M-TRENDS 2015: A VIEW FROM THE FRONTLINES, www2.fireeye.com/rs/fireye/ 
images/rpt-m-trends-2015.pdf.  
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When systems are extensively networked, infection of a single weak 
point can have widespread consequences. In the summer of 2017, for ex-
ample, the “NotPetya” malware attack operated by accessing a popular 
accounting firm and then inserting malware that spread throughout mil-
lions of computers when users updated their accounting software. 
AI systems will be no exception. Consider automobiles. When net-
worked, driverless cars become the norm, the vulnerable entry points for 
the system increase exponentially. Any point throughout the vast network 
of cars becomes a potential door for malicious entry, and the damage may 
be far greater, given the extent of the network. As a hacker, I only need to 
find one point of vulnerability throughout all of the cars and their car sys-
tems in order to make every car in the network run off the road.  
AI technologies are no more impregnable than any other technology. 
In particular, machine learning technologies are dependent upon their in-
put data. When attackers corrupt that data, the system will continue to 
think it is operating properly. For example, driverless cars use machine 
learning to decide what objects are in their surroundings, including 
whether something is a stop sign or a speed limit sign. By poisoning the 
data, one can corrupt the car’s decision making. One study, albeit a lim-
ited one, managed to confuse automated systems about the nature of stop 
signs by placing unobtrusive stickers on the signs.17 In other words, one 
can wreak havoc either by poisoning the training data or by poisoning the 
input data, if the input data is sufficiently open. 
With wearable technologies, particularly those related to health, the 
dangers can be particularly troubling. Research already has shown that heart 
pacemakers can be hacked.18 The more wearable and implantable technol-
ogies spread throughout society, the greater the consequences of tampering. 
The mortal consequences make either human supervision, or a degree of 
conservatism, a necessity. If an AI boss system is compromised and assigns 
                                                                                                                         
17 See Jonathan M. Gitlin, Hacking Street Signs with Stickers Could Confuse Self-Driving Cars, 
ARSTECHNICA (Sept. 1, 2017); see also Tianyu Gu et al., BadNets: Identifying Vulnerabilities 
in the Machine Learning Model Supply Chain, THE MORNING PAPER (Oct. 13, 2017), blog. 
acolyer.org/2017/10/13/badnets-identifying-vulnerabilities-in-the-machine-learning-model-
supply-chain/. 
18 Natt Garun, Almost Half a Million Pacemakers Need a Firmware Update to Avoid Getting Hacked, 
THE VERGE (Aug. 30, 2017), www.theverge.com/2017/8/30/16230048/fda-abbott-
pacemakers-firmware-update-cybersecurity-hack. 
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English speakers to jobs that require Spanish proficiency, a human can easily 
detect this type of mistake. Even more subtle attacks, like assigning the 
wrong specialist to a cyber security project, can be detected by a human 
thinking “someone else could do a better job at this.” 
Even bread-and-butter data analysis is likely to work best with a com-
bination of human and machine contributions. Large streams of data are 
impossible for humans to inspect by hand. Nevertheless, humans are far 
better than machines at playing detective, that is, noticing something that 
just does not seem right or finding an indication that points to a malware 
incursion and applying the creativity to figure out what is going on. Thus, 
AI may be best for sorting network traffic into smaller, human-
manageable groups of information that the more creative human counter-
parts can then puzzle through.  
Perhaps the greatest potential risk with widespread adoption of AI lies 
with circumstances in which disruptions are combined with fear. In that 
context, small incursions can have an echo effect, magnifying the harm 
exponentially. Imagine an attacker who changes the manufacturing in-
structions for a single bottle of a medication, or a hacker who alters the 
pattern for one person’s pacemaker.19 Although most of the medications 
or medical devices are perfectly fine, widespread fear could lead to great 
harm if patients refuse to take their medication, decline to have pacemak-
ers installed, or demand to have them removed. These examples are 
somewhat analogous to terrorism attacks. The death toll from large-scale 
terrorist attacks in this country in the last year was small compared with 
the death toll from “boring” killers, like the flu. In fact, from 12,000 to 
56,000 people have died from the flu each year in the United States since 
2010.20 Nevertheless, terrorism causes panic, underlying anxiety, and an 
erosion of trust in a manner that is widespread and culturally significant. 
In this way, trust and distrust can wrap back around each other and 
collide to provide the maximum risk for chaos and societal disruption. 
Imagine a time in which each person has an implanted health device, call it 
                                                                                                                         
19 See text accompanying notes 22-23 infra (describing the fallout from a 1982 episode of 
malicious tampering with Tylenol bottles).  
20 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, ESTIMATING SEASONAL INFLUENZA-
ASSOCIATED DEATHS IN THE UNITED STATES, www.cdc.gov/flu/about/disease/us_flu-
related_deaths.htm (last updated Jan. 29, 2018). 
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a health regulator. The device contains that person’s health information, 
monitors various bodily functions, and can even direct implantable devices 
such as pacemakers or automated medicine dispensing mechanisms. The 
technology for such a device – at least a rudimentary one – is not too far 
off in the future. Now consider the following hypothetical. A recent immi-
grant from North Korea is seriously injured and comes to an urgent care 
center. The patient’s health regulator alerts the medical team to the need 
for a blood transfusion and indicates that the patient’s blood type is AB 
negative. A nurse recognizes the information is suspect, given that the blood 
type AB negative is almost nonexistent in the Korean population. Further 
investigation shows that the person’s health data has been corrupted and 
that the problem most likely extends beyond this one patient. Early indica-
tions suggest that the health data problem exists only in relation to recent 
immigrants from North Korea, and that it was done intentionally.  
The fallout from such a data incursion into a health care network could 
be extensive. Patients from North Korea might refuse to receive medical 
treatment, for fear that their health information would lead the medical 
team astray. Those fears could cascade throughout immigrant populations, 
or throughout patient populations in general, both for rational and irrational 
reasons. On the irrational side, the public in general or smaller groups in 
particular could easily misunderstand whether the data corruption extends 
beyond the North Korean immigrant population. On the rational side, 
citizens might fear that a limited incursion could be the beginning of larger 
incursions, either by this attacker or by others.  
On another level, a health system, accustomed to relying on the effi-
ciency of its health regulators, would be thrown into disarray as medical 
professionals must decide how to treat patients and make medical deci-
sions without that input, not to mention what information and devices 
remain reliable. Should a medical care facility move to hand checking in-
formation for all patients, a laborious process, or only recent North Korean 
immigrants? How will North Korean immigrant populations respond if 
delivery of their health services is slowed in comparison to health services 
for others?  
The potential social implications also are profound. Disruption of the 
health care system connected to a recent immigrant population creates the 
potential for backlash against immigrant populations in the United States 
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and abroad. Distrust of information in general could cascade to make vari-
ous populations, particularly vulnerable populations such as new immi-
grants, unwilling to trust any information from the government, whether 
it is about the recent incursion in particular or health care in general. Such 
an outcome could lead immigrant populations to look for other sources of 
information and not all of those sources would necessarily have the best of 
intentions.21  
Looking beyond civilian implications, government actors would be 
pressed to determine whether the data corruption represents a ransom-
ware or malware attack that merely uses immigrant populations as a con-
venient entry point; sabotage from North Korea; a domestic player target-
ing immigrants; or even enemies of North Korea trying to sow distrust. 
Regardless of the source, the attack could represent one prong of a larger 
campaign or simply provide inspiration for others. In short, a small and 
limited incursion could have extensive and profound effects on social co-
hesion and societal resources.  
III. 
THE PROBLEMS WITH  
REACTIVE ADAPTATION 
n 1982, seven people died after taking Tylenol capsules adulterated with 
cyanide, an event that led to changes in medical packaging and to the 
creation of anti-tampering laws.22 One might think of this history as a fine 
analogy – a blueprint that the legal system may use in adapting modern 
legal systems to manage issues created by AI. The government’s reaction 
in the Tylenol case, however, was no more than a reaction, and reactive 
jurisprudence is seriously limited.  
 
                                                                                                                         
21 See, e.g., Jiayang Fan, Chinatown’s Ghost Scam: When Elderly Immigrants Fall Prey to Fraudsters 
Promising Protective Blessings, Their Life Savings Are Spirited Away, NEW YORKER (Oct. 30, 
2017), www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/10/30/chinatowns-ghost-scam. 
22 See Ronald Reagan, Pres., U.S., Statement on Signing the Federal Anti-Tampering Act 
(Oct. 14, 1983) (describing the Tylenol attack’s relationship to the legislation, and not-
ing that “every American became keenly aware of the tremendous harm that can be done 
by a single deranged person”), www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=40636. 
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The problem lies beyond the fact that when legal systems adapt in reac-
tion, damage has already occurred. Nor is the problem simply that one may 
not think clearly in the middle of a crisis. (And of course, as the techie 
saying goes, weeks of programming can save hours of planning.) The real 
problem is that by the time one chooses to react, the choices may be lim-
ited. Within the social compact, we relinquish certain liberties related to 
the ends for which we have united,23 but it behooves us to decide which 
liberties to relinquish and which to nurture at a time when we still have 
sufficient choices available. Nowhere is this maxim more critical than at 
the dawn of a scientific revolution.  
In particular, science is not immune to the dictates of the legal system. 
Rather, science and law exist in a symbiotic relationship, with each having 
the ability to inform or obstruct the other. For example, science creates 
pathways that drive legal regimes, because law cannot dictate what science 
cannot accomplish.24 In turn, law affects the unfolding of scientific devel-
opment, and not simply by holding out the promise of goodies such as in-
tellectual property rights or punishments such as legal liability. Law also 
shapes the expectations of individual citizens, developing them and trim-
ming them. When a car driven by a 16-year-old hits mine on the road, I 
expect the driver to pay for the damage. I generally don’t expect remu-
neration from the local authorities, who made the bad judgment to grant a 
license to this 16-year-old, or from the driver’s parents, whose loose par-
enting styles might have influenced the level of driving care. 
These byways, into which we channel both human expectation and sci-
entific development, are best carved with thoughtful intention. The trick, 
and it will indeed be tricky, will be to ensure that as these technologies 
                                                                                                                         
23 See Robin Feldman, Coming to the Community, in IMAGINING NEW LEGALITIES, AMHERST 
SERIES IN LAW, JURISPRUDENCE, AND SOCIAL THOUGHT 88 (Austin Sarat ed., Stanford 2012) 
(describing Lockean legal theories); see also Peter Laslett, John Locke: Two Treatises of Govern-
ment: A Critical Edition 336-37, 341, 343 (Cambridge 1967) (including a reprinting of the 
1698 version of Locke’s Two Treatises) (describing the individual’s voluntary transition 
from “an uncontrolled enjoyment of all the Rights and Privileges of the Law of Nature” to 
membership in a political society in which “he authorizes the Society, or which is all one, 
the Legislative thereof to make Laws for him as the public good of the society”). 
24 Cf. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE & OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (Basic Books 1999) (arguing 
that software and hardware regulate liberty in cyberspace in a manner analogous to legal 
regulations).  
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permeate society, we design legal systems that embody appropriate levels 
of both trust and distrust.  
Within this context, one of the challenges to openness and access could 
be a rush to secure intellectual property rights in AI. Trade secrets are, 
quite simply, secret. Patents also fall short where openness is the goal. 
Although patents, in theory, disclose sufficient information so that others 
can make and use the invention, the reality is quite different. Particularly 
in fields related to artificial invention such as software, current doctrines 
require only that patents disclose the outcomes of the invention, not how 
to get there.25 Some other forms of invention rights might be needed. 
In addition, AI systems should be subject to review entirely outside the 
system itself – either industry bodies or public bodies. As an average citi-
zen, I may never understand how a biologic interchangeable is being pro-
duced, at least not enough to trust that the drug is safe. Nevertheless, I 
might trust the FDA. This form of institutionalized outside review, 
whether by private or public entities, will be essential for adequate trust 
and distrust.  
Regardless of the final routes chosen, the point is simply that society 
has an opportunity to craft legal regimes on a broad scale. Think about the 
quintessential notion of the distribution of power among the states within 
the federal system. The electoral college – much maligned in modern com-
mentary – played a central role in ensuring the coalescence of a nation in 
which small and sparsely populated states feared domination by the mighty 
few.26 This is not to suggest that the arrival of AI lies on a par with the birth 
of the nation. Rather, the juxtaposition of imagery is a reminder of the 
power of considered thought in contrast to frenzied reaction. We are at 
the dawn of an era, albeit one that is scientific rather than political. Rather 




                                                                                                                         
25 See ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 104-127 (Harvard 2012) (describing the 
development of modern patent doctrines for software-related inventions). 
26 See generally William C. Kimberling, Deputy Dir., Fed. Elec. Comm’n Off. of Elec. 
Admin., The Electoral College, transition.fec.gov/pdf/eleccoll.pdf (revised May 1992). 
